Thu, Jul 23

The Most Expensive Mistakes in Energy Projects Happen Before the First Dollar Is Spent

Ask anyone in this industry where projects die, and you'll hear about interconnection queues, supply chains, cost overruns, community opposition. All real. But in my experience advising energy and infrastructure investments on two continents, those are rarely where the failure originates. They are where it becomes visible.

The failure itself usually happened years earlier, in a conference room, when the decision to commit was made — without structure, under uncertainty, with the risks that would eventually kill the project sitting quietly in a category someone labeled "manageable."

The front end is where the money is really spent

There is an asymmetry at the heart of every capital project: the decisions made before financial close determine most of the project's lifetime cost and risk exposure, yet they receive a fraction of the analytical rigor applied later. Once capital is committed, we model everything — O&M scenarios, degradation curves, merchant price risk. Before commitment, too many decisions run on deal momentum, sponsor optimism, and a diligence checklist.

This is especially dangerous right now in markets like Texas. ERCOT's load growth from data centers and electrification is pulling enormous amounts of capital toward generation, storage and transmission at unprecedented speed. Speed is not the enemy. Unstructured speed is. When everyone is racing to secure sites, queue positions and offtake, the pressure to treat regulatory and environmental risk as paperwork — rather than as a core driver of project value — is at its highest exactly when the cost of doing so is greatest.

Regulatory and environmental risk is not a workstream. It's a valuation input.

I spent much of my career leading environmental and regulatory strategy for large energy and infrastructure projects in Brazil — transmission lines, generation, industrial facilities — in one of the most demanding permitting environments in the world. That experience teaches you something that translates surprisingly well to the U.S. market: permitting is never just a schedule item. It is a compressed expression of every stakeholder conflict, land constraint, and institutional bottleneck your project will ever face.

When a permit slips, the Gantt chart records a delay. What actually happened is that a risk which existed on day one — a community that was never mapped, an agency interpretation that was never tested, a land assumption that was never verified — finally presented its invoice. The delay is the symptom. The unstructured early decision is the disease.

Developers who treat these risks as inputs to the investment decision itself — priced, weighted, and capable of changing the answer — consistently outperform those who treat them as a compliance function that reports to the schedule.

What "structured" actually means

Decision structure is not bureaucracy, and it is not another 200-page risk register nobody reads. In our practice it comes down to four disciplines, applied before commitment:

  1. Frame the real decision. "Should we build this project?" is rarely the actual question. The actual question is usually "Which configuration, on which timeline, under which regulatory strategy, clears our risk-adjusted threshold — and what would have to be true for the answer to be none?" Teams that never articulate the kill condition don't have a decision process; they have an approval process.

  2. Separate uncertainty from risk appetite. Half the front-end arguments I've refereed were not disagreements about facts, but undeclared disagreements about how much risk the capital was willing to carry. Making that explicit — before the data fight — resolves more conflicts than any amount of additional study.

  3. Test the assumptions that can change the answer. Not all assumptions deserve diligence. The ones that do are those whose failure flips the decision. In energy projects, regulatory and environmental assumptions sit disproportionately in that category — and they are disproportionately the ones taken on faith.

  4. Build a defensible rationale. Boards, investment committees and lenders don't just need the right answer; they need to be able to show why it was right given what was knowable at the time. When conditions change — and in this market, they will — a documented rationale is the difference between adapting a strategy and defending a mistake.

The transition raises the stakes

The energy transition is, at its core, a portfolio of irreversible capital decisions made under deep uncertainty — technological, regulatory, political. The industry has become vastly better at engineering these projects. I'd argue we have not become correspondingly better at deciding them.

That gap is where fortunes will be made and lost over the next decade. Not in the technologies themselves, but in the quality of the decisions that allocate capital among them.

The good news: decision quality is a discipline, not a talent. It can be structured, taught and audited. And unlike almost everything else in this industry, improving it requires no interconnection agreement, no supply chain, and no permit.

It only requires admitting that the most expensive phase of your project is the one that looks free: the part before the first dollar is spent.


Mariângela Ciodaro is the founder of CSD Strategy, a Texas-based decision and risk advisory supporting investors and developers in energy and infrastructure.

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