* Risks of DOE’s Surplus Plutonium Program Assessed.
It Won’t be Easy to Do It.
* Oklo Claims to Have a Fuel Recycling Process. How Does it Work?
* CSIS – Congressional Concerns Identify Four Key Issues
Risks of DOE’s Surplus Plutonium Program Assessed.
It Won’t Be Easy to Do It.
In late October the Department of Energy (DOE) announced a plan to dispose of about 20 tonnes of surplus plutonium by making it available to developers of advanced nuclear reactors.
The agency’s Surplus Plutonium Utilization Program request for applications (RFA) contains the details of what material are being offered – oxide and metal forms, the agency’s requirements for civilian nuclear reactor developers to use it, and the outcomes the government wants from the use of the weapons grade material in civilian nuclear reactors.
The 19.7 metric tons of plutonium materials listed by DOE as surplus in the RFA reportedly include about 15.3 metric tons of plutonium in oxide form and about 4.4 metric tons in metal form. It is unclear how much work will be required to convert the material into usable fuel, e.g., HALEU levels of enrichment at less than 20% U235, for use in advanced reactors.
A key driver of DOE’s surplus plutonium program is that the National Nuclear Security Administration( NNSA) at the Savannah River Site (SRS) is under legal obligation to dispose of six tonnes of “impure” surplus plutonium which means removing it from the SRS site in South Carolina. DOE’s objective Is “to expedite the removal of plutonium from South Carolina and permanently dispose of weapons-grade plutonium declared excess to national security.”
DOE’s plan, apparently, is to hand off all the SRS material to advanced reactor firms to turn it into HALEU grade fuel. The other approximately 14 tonnes will come from other NNSA sources including the NNSA Pantex Site in Amarillo, TX, which disassembles obsolete nuclear weapons and recovers the fissile materials from them.
What’s in the DOE RFA?
In the RFA, DOE stated that it is establishing a program to make surplus plutonium materials available to industry for use in advanced nuclear technologies. The formal process to apply for the surplus plutonium is in DOE’s Request for Applications (RFA). Responses were required by 11/21/25.
Applicants from commercial companies were required to describe their detailed recycling and processing plans, including funding commitments and schedules to use the surplus plutonium materials for reactors that will be built and operated in the U.S. or, under export controls, operated in other countries.
DOE is in a Hurry to Get the Job Done
The agency using a special method called “Other Transaction Agreements” (OTA) to move the program to a point where it can make decisions about which firms will get the plutonium.
This method in its generic form allows DOE to authorize facilities that “would not require licensing by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), but that after DOE approval “may be fast-tracked for future NRC licensing.”
Applicants who are awarded the use of DOE surplus plutonium and are successful in turning it into usable fuel for their advanced reactors, are also required to give DOE a piece of the action. DOE includes in its RFA a requirement that applicants must license any intellectual property, developed under this program, to the agency “for specific uses of novel data, technical, financial, or other information” that could be used by the agency for future R&D, safety measures, or any other use that NNSA requires.
DOE’s Plan is for a Free Ride on Plutonium Disposition R&D
What this looks like is that DOE has de facto outsourced a plutonium fuel and disposition R&D program under the guise of offering fuel for advanced reactors in return for solving DOE’s seemingly intractable problem of what to do with the agency’s surplus of weapons grade materials.
In other words, DOE is offering plutonium to applicants and is requiring them to accept 100% of the financial and operational risks and obligations of working with surplus weapons grade plutonium. As an added requirement, DOE wants a non-exclusive but free license to use the details of any successes for its own purposes.
In short, DOE’s plan is to gets a free ride to receive the results of some of the most hazardous and complex R&D that any organization could take on. DOE is, in effect, shifting the burden of plutonium disposition, along with all the risks, from the public sector to private firms.
DOE calls this “unlocking the next level of private funding,” as part of its requirement that “selected companies must meet costs of carrying out their proposal.”
Even more interesting is that the RFA notes that applicants may be required to pay a “cost recovery fee” for getting the plutonium in the first place. In the RFA DOE was vague about how the fee would be calculated and under what conditions it might be imposed.
Who Are Potential Applicants?
A survey of developers of advanced nuclear reactors points to four obvious applicants. While there may be others, these four stand out due to their publicly announced reactor fuel development plans.
None of these firms, nor any others, have publicly confirmed that they submitted applications to participate in the DOE surplus plutonium program. Reuters reported on 10/22/25 DOE expects to begin announcing by 12/31/25 which companies will take about 19.7 metric tons of surplus Cold War-era plutonium for eventual processing into nuclear reactor fuel.
Oklo has announced plans to build a $1.68 billion nuclear fuel plant in Oak Ridge, TN. It claims to have a process to turn plutonium into fuel. One of its objectives is to transform surplus fuel from the EBR-II project into fuel for the first core fuel load for its Aurora Powerhouse reactors, a 15 MW SMR, to be built at the Idaho National Laboratory.
~ See below ~ Oklo Claims to Have a Fuel Recycling Process. How does it Work?
Lightbridge is a developer and manufacturer of metallic fuel. It has an agreement with Oklo to use the capabilities of Oklo’s fuel plant to make its proprietary metallic nuclear fuel. Lightbridge wrote in an October 2025 white paper, “Converting this surplus into reactor fuel creates multiple benefits. It generates economic value from material that would otherwise require costly long-term storage. Metallic fuel manufacturing is less complex than MOX fuel fabrication, reducing technical risk and cost. Also, it provides fuel supply security for the burgeoning SMR industry.”
NewCelo is a financial partner with Oklo for the Oak Ridge, TN, nuclear fuel plant and will need fuel from it to run its advanced small modular reactor. World Nuclear News reported on 10/17/25 that Newcleo is planning to invest up to $2 billion “via an affiliated investment vehicle,” with the investment spanning “multiple projects under US oversight” and aiming to “foster transatlantic cooperation that enhances energy security, and focus on creating a robust and resilient fuel ecosystem.“
“This effort includes co-investment into, and co-location of, fuel fabrication facilities and could include repurposing surplus plutonium in a manner consistent with established U.S. safety and security requirements”.
Curio has announced a bench scale demonstration of its NuCycle voloxidation processing technology. The firm has a $5 million ARPAE grant that runs from 2023 through 2026 to reprocess spent nuclear fuel extracting the uranium in the form of gaseous uranium hexafluoride (UF6) “while keeping plutonium with the remaining actinides and fission products for further processing.”
The resulting UF6 can then be enriched to HALEU levels of less than 20% U235 for use in advanced reactors. The process does not envision turning the remainder PU239 into new forms of nuclear fuel. Curio writes in its project description that its NuCycle process “is designed to avoid production of pure plutonium (Pu) streams and dramatically reduce waste volumes compared with existing processes.”
Nonproliferation, Security, and Financial Issues
A key part of the RFA addresses the site and security requirements. The RFA states that applications must also include plans for stabilization, packaging, transporting, and storage, including disposition of plutonium-bearing materials and waste; consideration of material safeguards and security plan. DOE also wants a plan for qualification of plutonium-containing fuel.
A companion set of risks is the stringent and costly security precautions needed to transport the surplus plutonium from SRS, Pantex, and other DOE sites to private sector facilities at Oak Ridge.
According to the RFA, any sites where plutonium is stored or processed “will be added to the Department of Energy’s IAEA Safeguards Eligible Facility List,” and plutonium stored and/or processed on land not owned or controlled by DOE “will be added to the NRC’s Eligible Facility List for IAEA Safeguards.”
Will DOE Plan’s Result in More White Elephants?
DOE’s previous effort to convert surplus plutonium into mixed oxide fuel (MOX) was a failure. In 2018 after years of delay and controversy, the NNSA on 10/10/18 formally terminated the mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility project at the Energy Department’s Savannah River Site in South Carolina.
Sharply rising costs, long construction delays, and doubt about the financial feasibility of the project were all factors that turned the multi-billion-dollar effort into a white elephant. The plant was supposed to convert 34 tonnes of surplus plutonium into 1,700 MOX fuel assemblies for use in U.S. based PWR type light water reactors.
DOE never resolved the issue of how many of the nation’s nuclear utilities had an interest in using MOX fuel or whether the agency could reliably deliver it in time to meet ironclad schedules associated with fuel outages at their reactors.
Expenses Likely to Outweigh Benefits for Short-Term Fuel Gains
In an interview with NeutronBytes, Ross Matzkin-Bridger, a senior director at the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), said that DOE’s surplus plutonium program “looks like a temporary bridge to eventual delivery of uranium HALEY fuel for use in advanced reactors.”
His key concern is “whether it make sense to introduce weapons grade material into the civilian nuclear fuel cycle.”
He also questions the economic assumption of the RFA. There is the issue, he says, “that the cost of reprocessing and fuel fabrication infrastructure build out will exceed the financial returns for a relatively short run of fuel fabricated as output.”
“Reprocessing is not economic without government subsidies. There is no free market solution to disposition of surplus plutonium”
He’s also worries if one or more of the developers offered the surplus plutonium fails it could leave DOE and taxpayers with the equivalent “of another West Valley.”
West Valley is a 150-acre area located 35 miles south of Buffalo, NY. It is home to the only commercial spent nuclear fuel reprocessing facility to operate in the United States. Operated by private sector firms from 1963 to 1972, the site processed 640 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel and generated over 600,000 gallons of liquid high-level waste. The private sector firms left behind a huge radioactive mess.
As of April 2025, 950 tons of radioactive liquid and solid waste have been removed from the site. Some of these wastes have been disposed of at the DOE Handford, WA, site. The low level radioactive waste was disposed of on-site using 20-foot-deep trenches. The West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) is managing the ongoing cleanup operation.
Why DOE’s Surplus Plutonium Plan Should be Rejected
In an interview on 11/17/25 with the Exchange Monitor, Matzkin-Bridger said, “reprocessing is a practice that fails on all fronts as it is expensive, does not produce enough fuel and creates even more highly-radioactive waste.”
“Each attempt to revive reprocessing ends the same way: billions of dollars down the drain, technical failures abound, and security risks increase,”
Matzkin-Bridger says the that “DOE is abdicating responsibility for PU239 disposal.”
“At a time when the world needs clean energy fast, reprocessing would be no more than a costly distraction.”
As for DOE’s plan to offer 20 tonnes of surplus plutonium to developers of advanced reactors, he says, “with advanced nuclear technology on the way, the country should reject reprocessing and focus on other types of nuclear innovation.”
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Oklo Claims to Have a Fuel Recycling Process.
How Does it Work?
Oklo’s nuclear fuel recycling process is a type of pyroprocessing that uses an electrochemical process to separate usable fuel from spent nuclear waste. This technology, which is being developed in collaboration with U.S. national laboratories, would allow Oklo to extract more than 90% of the remaining energy from used fuel and turn it into new fuel for its advanced fast reactors, like the Aurora powerhouse.
How the Process Works – Oklo’s process differs from traditional aqueous reprocessing methods because it’s a dry process that doesn’t use large amounts of water or chemical solvents. Instead, it involves electrorefining, a technique that has been demonstrated at the Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) Fuel Conditioning Facility.
Electrorefining – In this process, used nuclear fuel is submerged in a bath of molten salt. An electrical current is then applied to salt, which causes the usable elements in the fuel, like uranium and transuranics (e.g., plutonium), to migrate and collect on a cathode. This process separates the reusable material from the highly radioactive fission products, which remain in the molten salt.
Fuel Fabrication – The separated material, which is a mixture of uranium and transuranics, is then fabricated into new metal fuel for Oklo’s fast reactors. The process is designed to be proliferation-resistant because it keeps the transuranic materials together and doesn’t create a pure stream of plutonium.
Waste Reduction – By recycling the fuel, Oklo significantly reduces the volume of high-level radioactive waste that needs to be stored long-term, making disposal more economical and efficient.
This recycling technology is a key part of Oklo’s business model, aiming to provide a secure domestic fuel supply, reduce costs, and convert what is currently a liability—used nuclear fuel—into a valuable resource for generating clean energy.
Technical Challenges to Commercialization – While pyroprocessing has a strong historical foundation, its demonstration at the EBR-II was at a laboratory scale. Scaling this process to an industrial level for commercial operation has major technical and financial hurdles.
The process operates in an extremely harsh environment, with high temperatures of 500-700°C and uses highly corrosive molten salts. The entire operation must be conducted remotely within heavily shielded “hot cells” due to the extreme radioactivity of the materials, adding significant complexity and cost to the facility’s design and operation. Disposition of the radioactive waste stream must also be taken into account.
Economic Viability and Cost – Oklo’s narrative of “reducing costs” stands in contrast to a broader academic and expert debate about the economic viability of reprocessing. Research indicates that reprocessing is not currently cost-competitive with the “once-through” fuel cycle, particularly with today’s low uranium prices.
Oklo’s economic model does not appear to be based on the immediate market value of the recovered uranium, but rather on a long-term strategic value proposition. The model implicitly places significant value on a closed fuel cycle and the elimination of a long-term waste management liability, making it a bet on future market conditions and regulatory frameworks rather than on present economic realities. There is no guarantee that any of these assumptions will work out in favor of Oklo’s business nor that of any other developer of advanced nuclear reactors.
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CSIS – Congressional Concerns Identify Four Key Issues
In a review of DOE’s program to offer surplus plutonium to developers of advanced reactors, Heather Williams, Director, Project on Nuclear Issues and Senior Fellow, Defense and Security Department, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), highlights four issues identified by several members of Congress about the program. The full text of her report is found here:
In the analysis writes Williams writes;.
“First, it would increase proliferation risks. Reprocessing old plutonium could open the door to reprocessing for military purposes and increase the risks of theft for a crude atomic device. Additionally, the plan will allow for the export of reprocessing technology, which could create a latent nuclear capability in foreign countries, essentially giving them the technology to race to a bomb. These serious proliferation risks have not yet been addressed in any of the administration or DOE plans.”
“A second concern is that Trump’s plan would be more expensive than the current disposal plan. According to the September 10th Congressional letter, the current disposal plan will cost $20 billion, whereas processing could cost $49 billion.”
“There is a potential conflict of interest between Secretary of Energy Chris Wright and one of the companies slated to lead in civilian nuclear power, Oklo. Secretary Wright previously was on the Oklo Board of Directors, though he resigned in February 2025. Oklo is planning to build a $1.5 billion fuel center in Tennessee to recycle fuel, which ostensibly would play a crucial role in the administration’s plan.”
“Ultimately, the risks of Trump’s plan would depend not only on proliferation risks and costs, but also on what it means for the United States’ nuclear weapons modernization plans.”
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