Opponents frequently attack projects by claiming the scope of environmental review was too narrow and failed to consider broader impacts outside the project itself. Fossil-fuel opponents often use this approach to attack extraction-supporting infrastructure, such as pipelines and LNG export facilities. On May 29, 2025, the United States Supreme Court unanimously rejected this expansive view, in reversing and remanding Seven County Infrastructure Coalition v. Eagle County, Colorado and holding that the Surface Transportation Board’s (STB) Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) sufficiently complied with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The Court opined that the D.C. Circuit erred by not affording the STB the “substantial judicial deference” required under NEPA and erred on the merits by requiring the STB to consider indirect environmental effects from projects that are “separate in time or place” from the proposed project, the Uinta Basin Railway (the Project). The court emphasized that “[a] relatively modest infrastructure project should not be turned into a scapegoat for everything that ensues from upstream oil drilling to downstream refinery emissions.” Seven Cnty. Infrastructure Coal. v. Eagle Cnty., Colorado, 605 U.S. ____, 12 (2025) [“Seven County”].
The Court Objects to the Weaponization of NEPA
NEPA is a procedural statute that requires federal agencies to prepare an EIS for specific projects financed or authorized by the federal government. An EIS must address the proposed project’s significant environmental effects and cite reasonable alternatives to mitigate those impacts. The Majority indicated that the goal of NEPA is to provide agencies with a process that enables better decision-making and a more effective project management structure. The Majority noted that NEPA has often been criticized for halting and delaying projects, stating that “…NEPA has transformed from a modest procedural requirement into a blunt and haphazard tool employed by project opponents (who may not always be entirely motivated by concern for the environment) to try to stop or at least slow down new infrastructure and construction projects.” Id. at 8.
The proposed Project is an 88-mile railroad line that would connect Utah’s Uinta Basin, a rural but oil-rich area, to the national rail network, enabling more efficient transportation of oil to refineries along the Gulf Coast. STB approved construction of the Project after conducting a lengthy EIS that mentioned, but did not analyze, the foreseeable indirect upstream and downstream effects of the Project. The D.C. Circuit vacated STB’s EIS and stopped the Project, concluding that STB’s EIS improperly eliminated its analysis of “reasonably foreseeable impacts” coming from increased “upstream oil drilling” and “downstream oil refining projects.” Id. at 1.
The Supreme Court unanimously disagreed and warned that NEPA cannot be used to block or delay projects “under the guise of judicial review” of agency compliance. Id. at 13. The Court asserted that NEPA has become a “judicial oak that has hindered infrastructure development.” Id. at 9. To “course correct” what the Majority interprets as the wrong direction of NEPA, the Court emphasized two key points:
Courts are required to afford the agency “substantial judicial deference” under the statutory provisions of NEPA.
NEPA’s statutory provisions limit the scope of the environmental review to the effects of the project under review and do not extend to the “reasonably foreseeable” effects of an independent project.
To the first point, the Court further explained that a reviewing court must only assess whether the EIS reasonably explains the agency’s final decision. A court cannot inject itself in the decision-making process, as agencies are better suited to assess this fact-intensive decision. The Majority opined that an agency is afforded deference with respect to the “depth and breadth of its inquiry” within the EIS, so long as it remains within the “zone of reasonableness.” Id. at 8.
Pertaining to the second point, in this case, the Court found the indirect effects of increased upstream drilling and downstream refining were geographically distinct from the proposed Project and considered future impacts. Most notably, the Court stressed that expanded oil drilling and refining activities fall outside the agency’s “regulatory jurisdiction,” as the agency lacks authority to approve the upstream and downstream projects—something the Court heavily focused on.
Pursuant to this analysis, an agency is only required to assess the potential effects of the proposed project and does not need to consider independent future or geographically separate projects, even if “foreseeable.” An agency has “discretion” and “broad latitude” to draw this “manageable line” with respect to scope. Id. However, effects that are geographically or temporally distinct from, yet directly caused by, the proposed project still fall within the scope of the environmental review. But what falls within the scope of a proposed project can be a gray area, especially when projects are interrelated and closely tied in “place or time.” This question will turn on two things: (1) the causal connection between the proposed project and effects of the other project(s) and (2) whether the agency has authority and control over the other project(s). In this gray area, the Majority determined that a court must defer to the agency’s line of scope provided the line is “manageable” and “reasonable.”
Hodgson Russ Takeaways:
This decision narrows the scope of environmental review under NEPA at the agency level. There may now be a higher bar for project opponents challenging a federal agency’s EIS issued pursuant to NEPA. The Court emphasized that it will not enforce “speculative” and “attenuated” effects that ripple from a project outside the agency’s control. The Court noted that there is a stark distinction between agency best practices of an EIS under NEPA and the standard in which courts can reject an agency’s EIS. According to the Majority, Courts must review agency decisions with “substantial deference,” and if the agency’s final action is reasonable and reasonably explained by the EIS, a court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Together with recent amendments to the NEPA (42 U.S.C. §§ 4336a(e)(1)(A) and (g)(1)(A)) regarding page limits and review deadlines, this decision should result in shorter, less expensive reviews.
The Supreme Court’s emphasis on agency deference marks a stark deviation from its prior decisions. See Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024) (holding that a court may not defer to an agency’s interpretation of law in the case of an ambiguous statute). In this case, the Majority supported agency deference by characterizing the question of which details to be included in an EIS as one for the agency because it turns on a “factual determination.” Seven County at 2. However, the Majority still acknowledged that the “meaning of ‘detailed’ is a legal question.” Id. The Concurrence (written by Justice Sotomayor and joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson) would have avoided the deference issue entirely, deciding the case solely based on the agency’s lack of authority to prevent the upstream and downstream effects.
For further information, please contact Dan Spitzer, Alicia Legland, or any other member of the Hodgson Russ Environmental & Energy Practice (Law Clerk Emily Petermann assisted with the preparation of this Alert).
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