By Henry Sokolski
If growing tensions in the Indo-Pacific weren’t alarming enough, a recent round of nuclear provocations has only salted the wound.
On Oct. 29, U.S. President Donald Trump pledged to resume nuclear-weapons testing, taking leaders in the region by surprise.
Then, on Nov. 5, Russian President Vladimir Putin said Moscow will follow Trump’s lead and immediately resume nuclear-weapons testing. This was particularly alarming given Putin’s plans to withdraw from the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which prohibits tests involving nuclear explosions.
Meanwhile, Washington greenlit South Korea’s construction of a nuclear submarine. The U.S. may supply Seoul with the weapons-grade uranium to fuel these boats or allow South Korea to make its own nuclear fuel — the latter would enable Seoul to come within weeks of building a bomb.
Trump insists America’s allies need to do more for their own defense. Perhaps the U.S. could spend less on defending its allies if they went nuclear. Zachary Keck, a former Wohlstetter fellow at the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center rejects this conclusion. In his excellent, 296-page book, “Atomic Friends: How America Deals with Nuclear-Armed Allies,” he statistically proves the United States has consistently spent more on allied defense after they’ve gone nuclear than it did before.
This puts Japan in an awkward spot. The question is what might it do. It could go nuclear. In “Atomic Friends,” Keck notes that, although analysts have long argued that Japan would never go nuclear owing to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it still might. “A rapidly deteriorating security situation,” Keck writes, “has led Tokyo to consider revising its pacifist Constitution. It’s hardly unthinkable that Japan may eventually decide that rearmament should include a nuclear element, especially if China seizes the Senkaku Islands or Taiwan. If Tokyo did make this decision, no country is better prepared to rapidly build nuclear weapons.”
Japan is currently sitting on a stockpile of 16,000 kilograms of nuclear weapons-usable plutonium — enough to make more than 3,000 nuclear weapons. It has a mobile, solid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile-capable space launch vehicle (the H3 rocket), which can launch over 1,200 kilograms into low-Earth orbit — more than enough to deliver a nuclear warhead. It also has three advanced nuclear fusion research centers, which can help it develop boosted fission devices and true thermonuclear weapons. A minimal Japanese nuclear force might cost as little as $6 billion to stand up. It would hardly take long. Some estimate less than a year.
As for nuclear submarines, Japanese officials have long toyed with this idea. Late last month, Defense Minister Shinjiro Koizumi said building a nuclear-powered submarine had to be examined given Japan’s deteriorating security environment. The country could easily fabricate a naval reactor. It’s also considering developing vertical launch systems needed to deliver submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
All of this is exciting from a military perspective. Yet, Japan moving ahead on any of these nuclear options would be a mistake no matter what the United States, Russia or South Korea might do.
Building nuclear submarines would take 10 or more years and would cost billions. Their advantages over advanced nonnuclear submarines are minimal at best.
When it comes to keeping China from breaking out into the open Pacific beyond the “first island chain” — which extends from Japanese territory in the north through Taiwan, the Philippines and Southeast Asia — advanced nonnuclear submarines are a much better buy.
Having Japan conduct nuclear submarine patrols in the open Pacific would only complicate identifying friends versus foes for America’s nuclear fleet and its task of protecting Japan.
As for acquiring nuclear weapons, it only guarantees two things — making Japan a much more urgent military target for China, Russia and North Korea — and straining relations with the United States, Japan’s essential ally.
Yes, Tokyo could navigate these hazards, but not without risking either a major militarization that would pit it against its neighbors or a self-imposed nuclear-armed isolation that could have it still paying tribute to Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang.
Finally, Japan going nuclear will unavoidably serve as proliferation kindling. If it remains coy about its nuclear weapons aspirations as South Korea continues to chomp at the bit, Seoul will likely misread this and go for the bomb. This, in turn, will assure a Japanese nuclear reaction. If Tokyo goes, though, would its neighbors hold back?
The question is rhetorical. A far safer course would be for Japan to resist these temptations, recommit to nuclear nonproliferation and strengthen its security ties with its neighbors and Washington. Militarily, Japan is already building up its offensive and defensive capabilities against North Korea, Russia and China. It also is developing its own military space capabilities, which it can share with the United States and its closest allies. In addition, Tokyo is taking a much firmer stance in defense of Taiwan and the Philippines against Chinese adventurism.
As Tokyo doubles down on these routines, it should lean on Washington to make several “matching contributions.” Washington already includes Japan in its nuclear defense strategy planning.
As Tokyo doubles down on these routines, it should lean on Washington to make several “matching contributions.” Washington already includes Japan in its nuclear defense strategy planning. That must continue. It must also, however, start dialing in how the Pentagon intends to configure its Golden Dome to help defend Japan and America’s other Pacific friends.
One of these, of course, is Taiwan, which is a critical canary in Japan’s security coal mine. The United States certainly cannot expect Tokyo to defend Taipei more than Washington will. More importantly, if the United States offers Taiwan up for some bargain with China, Washington’s credibility with Japan will evaporate. Tokyo needs to make all these points crystal clear to the United States.
That said, Japan’s protection against China, its key adversary, will entail more than just increasing military spending or locking down more American security guarantees. In addition, it will require Japan to work with its economic allies to win the hearts, minds and pocketbooks of the peoples of Southeast Asia and beyond — “customers” that China is vying to win over. In this regard, Japan should be seen as a regional leader and a guide to other nations, including the United States. Winning this peace without waging a major war is the aim.
The tempting alternative, of course, is for Japan to go nuclear. It taking that path, however, leads us all in a very different direction.
Henry Sokolski is founder and executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and the editor of the book “Nuclear Proliferation’s Next Iteration,” published May 29. He served as deputy for nonproliferation policy in the office of the U.S. secretary of defense from 1989 to 1993.
This analysis first appeared in the Japan Times.